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Abstract Evidential markers encode the source of information that an individual
(the evidential Origo) has for a proposition. In root declaratives, the Origo is always
the speaker (see Korotkova 2016 and references therein). Instead, questions often
display interrogative flip: the Origo shifts to the hearer (Garrett 2001; Speas &
Tenny 2003, a.o.). While interrogative flip is widely attested across languages,
some evidentials have been reported not to flip in questions (see, e.g., San Roque,
Floyd & Norcliffe 2017; Bhadra 2017). What determines whether evidentials flip
or not? Recent work (Korotkova 2016; Bhadra 2017) has proposed that there is a
correlation between lack of flip and bias in questions. This paper contributes to
our understanding of the interaction of evidentials and bias by investigating the
behaviour of questions with the Italian non-predictive future. We characterize the
non-predictive future as an inferential evidential marker (see also Mari 2009; Eckardt
& Beltrama forthcoming), and show that lack of flip for the future correlates only
with a particular type of bias: a reversal of the default bias associated with negative
polar questions (Frana & Rawlins forthcoming). We trace back this pattern to an
interaction between the evidential component of the future and the operator that
triggers bias reversal.
Keywords: evidentiality, epistemic biases, questions, future, modality
1 Introduction
As is well known, evidential markers encode the source of information that an
individual (the evidential Origo) has for a proposition (the scope proposition). The
Cuzco Quechua examples in (1) illustrate the phenomenon: all of them signal that
the speaker has evidence for the claim that it is raining. This evidence is perceptual
in (1a), reportative in (1b), and inferential in (1c).
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(1) a. Para-sha-n=mi
rain-PROG-3=DIR
‘It is raining, I see’
b. Para-sha-n=si
rain-PROG-3=REP
‘It is raining, I hear’
c. Para-sha-n=chá
rain-PROG-3=CONJ
‘It is raining, I gather’ (adapted from Faller 2002: 3)
In root declaratives, the Origo is always the speaker (see, e.g., Korotkova 2016).
Instead, in questions, the Origo often shifts to the hearer, a phenomenon that has
been dubbed interrogative flip (Garrett 2001; Speas & Tenny 2003, a.o.). Questions
that display interrogative flip signal the source of evidence for the expected answer.
Consider the Cheyenne examples in (2). The assertion in (2a) conveys that the
speaker has reportative evidence for the scope proposition. The question in (2b)
requests the hearer to provide an answer on the basis of reportative evidence.
(2) a. É-némene-se˙ste
3-sing-RPT.3SG
Sandy.
Sandy
‘Sandy sang, I hear.’ (Murray 2010: 46)
b. Mo=é-némene-se˙ste
y/n=3-sing-RPT.3SG
Floyd?
Floyd
‘Given what you heard, did Floyd sing?’ (Murray 2010: 72)
While interrogative flip is a very widely attested interpretation for evidential
questions (see Bhadra 2017 for references) some evidentials have been reported not
to flip in questions (e.g., San Roque et al. 2017; Bhadra 2017). The Bangla question
in (3), where the reportative naki is anchored to the speaker, is a case in point.
(3) Mina
Mina
naki
NAKI
amerika
America
chol-e
go-IMPV
ja-cche?
go-3P.PRES.PROG
‘(Given what I hear), Mina is going away to America (is it true)?’
(Bhadra 2017: 5)
What determines whether evidentials shift in questions or not? Bhadra (2017)
and Korotkova (2016) make a link between lack of flip in evidential interrogatives
and bias. Korotkova contends that while neutral questions must obligatorily flip,
biased questions allow for lack of flip.1 Bhadra puts forward a stronger hypothesis:
1 Korotkova (2016) extends this claim to quiz questions, which we will not discuss here.
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that bias in questions and interrogative flip are in complementary distribution. This
paper contributes to our understanding of (lack of) flip for evidentials by investigating
the behaviour of questions with the Italian non-predictive future, which we analyze
as an evidential marker. We will see that, in Italian, lack of flip correlates only with
a particular type of bias — a reversal of the default bias normally associated with
negative polar questions (as in Frana & Rawlins forthcoming).
The discussion will proceed as follows: section 2 argues that the Italian non-
predictive future is an evidential. Section 3 shows that while positive polar questions
(PPQs) and wh-questions with the evidential future exhibit interrogative flip, there is
a subset of negative polar questions (NPQs) that do not flip. Section 4 discusses the
role that bias plays in this pattern: we show that the questions that do not flip exhibit
bias reversal, and suggest that this correlation arises through an interaction between
the evidential component of the future and the operator that reverses the default bias
for NPQs. Section 5 briefly concludes.
2 Setting the stage: the basic profile of the evidential future
Future morphology in Italian can convey not only predictions about the future (as
in (4)), but also hypotheses about the present or the past (see, e.g., Bertinetto 1979;
Mari 2009; Giannakidou & Mari 2013, 2018): the speaker of (5) conjectures that
Rosa is (/was) at the beach at the time of utterance (/yesterday).
(4) Rosa
Rosa
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
al
at-the
mare
sea
domani.
tomorrow
‘Rosa will be at the beach tomorrow.’
(5) Rosa
Rosa
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
(/sarà
(/be.FUT.3sg
andata)
gone)
al
at-the
mare
sea
oggi
today
(/ieri).
(/yesterday)
‘Rosa is (/was) at the beach today (/yesterday), I suppose.’
Below, we argue that, on the use illustrated by (5), the future is an inferential
evidential marker2 (see also Eckardt & Beltrama forthcoming; Mari 2010).3
2 The use of temporal morphology to convey evidentiality is common cross-linguistically (see, e.g., the
evidential perfect in Bulgarian, Georgian or Turkish (Izvorski 1997; Smirnova 2012; Koev 2017)).
3 Giannakidou & Mari (2018) and Farkas & Ippolito (2019) have recently put forward alternative
analyses of the Italian future. Giannakidou & Mari treat the future as a universal modal akin to must
(see also Giannakidou & Mari 2013). Farkas & Ippolito convincingly argue that this type of account
is not tenable, as the non-predictive future patterns differently from universal modals (see also section
2.1 below). On Farkas & Ippolito’s account, the (non-predictive) future is a non-epistemic modal
with a subjective likelihood component. As Farkas & Ippolito’s work was developed in parallel to
ours, time constraints prevent us from engaging with their proposal in this paper.
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2.1 The future as an evidential marker
On its non-predictive use, the Italian future can be characterized as an inferential evi-
dential marker (we will henceforth refer to this use as ‘evidential future’, abbreviated
as ‘EF’.) First of all (2.1.1), the EF specifies the source of information for the claim
made: it signals that the scope proposition has been inferred from indirect evidence
(or it is a mere conjecture based on no evidence at all). Second, the EF has two traits
that are shared by evidentials across languages: obligatory speaker-orientation in
root assertions (2.1.2) and impossibility of challenging the evidential claim (2.1.3).4
2.1.1 The EF as an inferential evidential
The EF patterns with inferential evidentials — it is infelicitous when the Origo (the
speaker in root assertions, see 2.1.2) has direct evidence for the scope proposition
(witness (6)), but felicitous when she has inferred the scope proposition from indirect
evidence, as in (7) and (8) (all the examples are adapted from Matthewson 2015).5
(6) Context: Speaker smells something good.
# Qualcosa
Something
profumerà.
perfume.FUT.3sg
‘Something smells good, I suppose.’
(7) Context: Speaker smells a smell like burning meat.
Si
CL
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
bruciata
burnt
la
the
carne.
meat
‘The meat has burnt, I suppose.’
(8) Context: Speaker cooked some chicken in the morning and left it on the
kitchen counter. When she gets back in the evening all the chicken is gone.
She knows that the dog was alone in the apartment.
Il
The
cane
dog
avrà
have.FUT.3sg
rubato
stolen
il
the
pollo.
chicken
‘The dog stole the chicken, I suppose.’
4 We will not discuss the predictive use of the future but we would like to note in passing that the
predictive use patterns differently from the evidential one with respect to the properties that we
discuss here (cf. Giannakidou & Mari 2013, 2018 for a unified analysis of both uses.)
5 The fact that the EF is infelicitous in direct evidence contexts was also noted by Mari 2010 and
Giannakidou & Mari 2013. These works analyse the EF as an epistemic modal with an evidential
requirement, akin to English must (von Fintel & Gillies 2010), a view that we will not endorse here.
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The inferences conveyed by assertions with the EF vary in their strength: they
range from grounded inferences (which can be reinforced by adverbials as in (9), see
Bertinetto 1979) to mere guesses (as in (10)). A similar pattern has been reported
for other inferential evidentials (see, e.g., Murray 2017 on Cheyenne, and Rullmann,
Matthewson & Davis 2008 on Lilloet Salish.6)
(9) Context: You know that at this time of the day Rosa can only be either at
home or at work. You call her home and she is not there. You say:
Allora
Then
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
{di
{for
sicuro,
sure,
senza
without
dubbio}
doubt}
a
at
lavoro.
work
‘Then she must be {surely, undoubtedly} at work.’
(10) Context: it’s a sunny day . . .
A: Where is Rosa?
B: Non
Not
so.
know.PRES.1sg.
Sarà
be.FUT.3sg
in
in
spiaggia
beach
. . .
‘I don’t know. She might be at the beach . . . .’
The limiting cases are contexts where the EF presents a conjecture for which the
speaker lacks evidence. (11), adapted from Bhadra 2016, illustrates this use (which
Bhadra (2016) notes is cross-linguistically common for inferential evidentials).7
(11) Evidence-neutral context (The Soldier): Elena’s husband is a soldier
away at war. His whereabouts are completely unknown at the moment.
Carmela is trying to comfort Elena:
Non
Not
ti
you
preoccupare,
worry,
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
sano
sane
e
and
salvo.
safe
‘Do not worry, I am sure he is safe and sound.’
6 But note that the translations with must and might used in (9) and (10) are only approximate.
Despite the availability of a seemingly might-like interpretation (as in (10)), the EF doesn’t allow for
conjunctions of incompatible propositions: the example in (i), for instance, is ruled out.
(i) # Starà
be.FUT.3sg
piovendo,
raining,
ma
but
non
not
starà
be.FUT.3sg
piovendo.
raining
‘I assume it is raining, but I assume it is not raining.’
In this, the EF contrasts with the Lilloet Salish inferential evidential k’a (Rullmann et al. 2008).
7 Notice the contrast with epistemic modals like must and might. In (11), a must statement would be
blatantly false (and thus inappropriate); a might statement would presumably be true, but pragmatically
very different from (11) in that it would lack comforting effect.
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Given the data in this section, we can informally state the evidential contribution
of the EF as in (12).8
(12) Origo has at most indirect evidence for the scope proposition.
2.1.2 Speaker-orientation
One of the hallmarks of evidentials across languages is that they are anchored to
the speaker in (root) declaratives (see Korotkova 2016, a.o.). The EF follows this
pattern. This can be illustrated by using the scenario in (13), originally designed to
show that epistemic modals allow for non-autocentric readings (for discussion, see
von Fintel & Gillies 2011, Yanovich forthcoming, and references therein.) Bill can
utter the might statement in (13) but (should he be speaking Italian), he would not be
able to utter (14), with the EF.9
(13) Context: Ann is planning a surprise party for Bill, but Chris told Bill all
about it. Now Bill and Chris are watching Ann set up the party without
being discovered. Currently Ann is walking past Chris’s apartment carrying
a large supply of party hats. She sees a bus on which Bill frequently rides
home, so she jumps into some nearby bushes to avoid being spotted. Bill
and Chris are both watching from Chris’s window and Chris asks Bill why
Ann is hiding in the bushes. Bill says:
I might be on that bus. (Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson 2005: 16)
(14) # Sarò
be.FUT.1sg
su
on
quel
that
bus.
bus
‘I am on that bus, I suppose.’
(Unavailable: ‘I am on that bus, she supposes.’)
8 This formulation assumes a hierarchy of types of evidence where indirect evidence < direct evidence.
On this view, the ban on direct evidence might be derived as a pragmatic inference (see Faller 2012
for a proposal along these lines.)
9 The EF can however combine with according to-phrases that specify that the relevant evidence is that
of a third person (see Mari 2010):
(ii) Secondo
According-to
Pepa,
Pepa,
Gianni
Gianni
sarà
be.fut.3sg
a
at
casa.
home
‘According to Pepa, Gianni is presumably at home.’
We hypothesize that (ii) might be amenable to the same analysis as examples where the EF is
embedded under attitudes. In those cases, the EF is always anchored to the attitude holder (one of the
possible patterns displayed by evidentials (see Korotkova 2016 and references therein.))
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2.1.3 Non-challengeability of evidential requirement
Another cross-linguistically stable property of evidentials is that, while the scope
proposition is directly challengeable, the evidential claim is not (see, e.g., Murray
2017 and references therein). The EF patterns once again with evidentials: in (15),
that’s not true can be used to challenge the scope proposition p (that Luca is ill), but
not the evidential claim (that the speaker has at most inferential evidence for p). An
attempt to use that’s not true to contest the evidential claim (by stating that B has
direct evidence for p) results in infelicity.
(15) A: Why is Luca absent today?
B: Sarà
FUT.3sg
malato.
ill
‘He is ill, I suppose.’.
C: That’s not true. He is perfectly well.
D: # That’s not true. You saw that he was ill.
2.2 What is at issue? Our take on the EF
While analyses of evidentials differ with respect to the status of the scope proposi-
tion,10 many of them share the view that the evidential claim is not-at-issue content
(Izvorski 1997; Faller 2002; Murray 2010, 2017, among many others). One of the
core arguments for this view is the fact that the evidential claim cannot be directly
challenged (2.1.3), a standard test for not-at-issueness (see Diagnostic 1 in Tonhauser
2012). However, Korotkova (2016) questions this argument, and contends that the
non-challengeability of the evidential claim is a by-product of subjectivity: as we
have seen (section 2.1.2), evidentials (in root assertions) are always interpreted with
respect to the speaker’s evidence. Korotkova argues that this evidence is privileged
information, not accessible to other speakers, and therefore not challengeable.11
While we cannot fully engage in the at-issue / not-at-issue debate, we will take
the evidential claim of the EF to be not-at-issue, and advance a further argument for
not-at-issueness. This argument hinges on the answerhood conditions for questions
with the EF. In (16), B’s negative answer to A’s question cannot target the evidential
10 Some choice points are: is the scope proposition a modalized proposition or not?; is the scope
proposition asserted or put forward as some weaker speech act (‘presentation’, see Faller 2002)? We
will not be able to make justice to these debates here.
11 This argument goes back to Papafragou (2006). (Non)-challengeability (which Papagragou calls
the assent/dissent test) has been used to argue that subjective modals (Lyons 1977) are not truth-
conditional. According to Papafragou, subjective modals cannot be challenged /agreed with simply
because the type of modality they express “is externally inscrutable” (Papafragou 2006: 1698).
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component:12 B rejects the proposition that Gianni went to the gym, not that she has
(at most) indirect evidence for whether Gianni went to the gym. This argument does
not run into the same issues as the non-challengeability test: A’s question displays
flip: it requests B to give an answer based on B’s own evidence (see section 3).
Since B should be able to access her own evidence, the impossibility of targeting the
evidential component with a negative answer cannot be due to subjectivity.
(16) A: Gianni
Gianni
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
andato
gone
in
in
palestra?
gym
‘Did Gianni go to the gym, what’s your guess?’
B: No (he didn’t go) / No (# I saw that he went to the gym).
What kind of not-at-issue content does the evidential requirement of the EF
contribute? Presuppositional analyses have been challenged on the grounds that the
evidential requirement does not impose a pre-condition on the input context (see,
e.g., Tonhauser 2013; Koev 2017). However, Murray (2017) notes that while the
evidential requirement in Cheyenne is not presuppositional in assertions, it is in
questions. The EF displays the same pattern. B’s assertion in (15) is felicitous even
if A (wrongly) assumes that B has direct evidence for the answer, but the question in
(17) requires a context where it is taken for granted that the addressee has at most
indirect evidence for the answer (see section 3 for further discussion).
(17) Luca
Luca
sarà
be.FUT.3sg
malato?
sick
‘Is Luca sick, what’s your guess?’
Given this, we will take the evidential requirement in questions to be a presup-
position (as in Murray 2017) conveying that Origo has at most indirect evidence
for the answer. In assertions, the evidential requirement might be another type of
not-at-issue content (as Murray claims for Cheyenne), or perhaps a presupposition
that is easier to accommodate. As the focus of our paper is on questions, we will not
attempt to decide between these two possibilities.
What about the scope proposition? Question-answer pairs strongly suggest that
the propositional alternatives in the denotation of questions with the EF are not
modal. In (16), B’s no answer (necessarily) denies that Gianni went to the gym.
Instead, a yes answer would commit B to the claim that Gianni did go to the gym.
This contrasts with modal questions like (18), where a yes/no answer could be used
12 This argument has been used to argue that the common ground management operators VERUM and
FALSUM are not-at-issue (see Gutzmann & Miró 2011; Romero 2015; Frana & Rawlins forthcoming).
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to agree/disagree either with the prejacent of the modal or with the modal claim.13
(18) A: Might Gianni be at the gym?
B: Yes (he is/he might be).
3 The evidential future in questions
This section presents some initial data regarding questions with the EF. We will
see that the behaviour of the EF in questions is not uniform. While positive polar
questions (PPQs) and wh- questions always display interrogative flip, which aligns
with a conjectural interpretation (section 3.1), some negative polar questions (NPQs)
allow for lack of flip (section 3.2).
3.1 Positive polar questions and wh-questions
PPQs and wh- questions with the EF are ruled out when the hearer is assumed to
have direct evidence for the answer: the examples in (19) are distinctly odd.
(19) a. # Sarai
Be.FUT.2sg
sposato?
married
‘Are you married, what’s your guess?’
b. # Quanti
How-many
anni
years
avrai?
have.FUT.2sg
‘How old are you, what’s your guess?’
This follows if the evidential requirement in questions is a presupposition (see
section 2.2) and if the questions in (19) display interrogative flip. If so, the Origo
parameter will shift to the hearer, and thus the questions in (19) will trigger the
presupposition in (20). As any context compatible with world knowledge will fail to
satisfy this condition, the questions in (19) are infelicitous.
(20) The hearer has (at most) indirect evidence for the answer.
In contrast, the questions in (21) (that ask the addressee to draw an inference
about Gianni’s whereabouts) are felicitous, as are the questions in the evidence-
neutral scenario in (22) (where the addressee can at best provide a guess.) So far,
then, questions with the EF are the mirror image of the assertions in section 2.1.1.
13 If the scope proposition is not modal, a speaker that utters a declarative sentence with the EF cannot
be asserting that proposition. An utterance of FUT(p) often conveys a weakened commitment towards
p . This is compatible with a Faller-style analyis (e.g., Faller 2002) on which declaratives with the EF
would put forward the scope proposition by means of a speech act weaker than assertion (see also
Zimmermann 2008 for a proposal along these lines for German wohl.)
735
Frana, Menéndez-Benito
(21) Context: S knows that H doesn’t know where Gianni is at the moment, but
she also knows that H is familiar with Gianni’s habits. S asks:
a. Gianni
Gianni
sarà
be.FUT.3sg.
a
at
casa
home
a
at
quest’ora?
this-hour
‘Is Gianni at home at this time of the day, what’s your guess?’
b. Dove
Where
sarà
be.FUT.3sg.
Gianni
Gianni
a
at
quest’ora?
this-hour
‘Where is Gianni at this time of the day, what’s your guess?’
(22) Evidence-neutral context (The Soldier): S’s husband is a soldier away at
war. His whereabouts are completely unknown. Seeking comfort, S asks H:
a. Sarà
be.FUT.3sg
sano
sound
e
and
salvo?
safe
‘Is he safe and sound, what’s your guess?’
b. Dove
where
sarà?
be.FUT.3sg
‘Where is he, what’s your guess?’/ ‘Where could he be?’
Some remarks about the evidence-neutral scenario (22) are in order. As noted
above, the best the hearer can do in this type of context is to advance a conjecture.
We further note that not answering would be an unmarked conversational move
in this case. Thus, this example aligns with what the literature dubs conjectural
questions (attested for inferential evidentials in a number of languages), which do
not require the hearer to answer (Littell, Matthewson & Peterson 2010; Murray
2017, a.o.). The standard assumption in the literature is that conjectural questions
have a source different from interrogative flip (see discussion in Eckardt Submitted).
However, we contend that in the case of the EF, questions like the ones in (22)
do instantiate flip: they are the flipped version of assertions in evidence-neutral
contexts. In what follows, we will use ‘conjectural questions’ as a cover term to
refer to questions for which the hearer is not expected to know the answer, including
both questions where the hearer is asked to provide an evidence-based inference and
questions where the hearer can only advance an (ungrounded) guess.
3.2 Negative polar questions
While PPQs and wh-questions consistently display interrogative flip, NPQs exhibit a
mixed pattern. Consider first the context in (23). In this context, the speaker cannot
ask Ana the question in (23a) but he could in principle ask the question in (23b) to
Bea (while pointing at Ana discreetly). This is all as expected: the presupposition of
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(23a) is not met in this context (Ana has direct evidence regarding the question of
whether she is hungry), but the presupposition of (23b) is met (Bea is not expected
to have direct evidence regarding that question). Just like the questions in 3.1, the
NPQs in (23) have a conjectural interpretation (which we argue correlates with flip).
(23) Context (no appetite): S invited Ana and Bea for dinner and made it clear
that he was going to cook up a storm. At dinner, Ana barely touches her food.
a. # Non
not
avrai
have.FUT.2sg
fame?
hunger?
(addressing Ana)
‘Are you not hungry, what’s your guess?’
b. Non
not
avrà
have.FUT.3sg
fame?
hunger?
(addressing Bea)
‘Is she not hungry, what’s your guess?’
But now consider the context in (24). Here, the speaker can pose the question in
(24) to the hearer. This is unexpected: the presupposition that, given what we have
said, should be triggered by the EF in (24) is not met in this context.
(24) Context (insatiable): S and H had a big lunch and are now sitting at a bar
for drinks. H asks for the food menu. S asks H:
Non
not
avrai
have.FUT.2sg.
mica
NEG-PART
fame?
hunger?
‘Am I right in guessing that you are not hungry?’ (very roughly)
Why is a non-conjectural interpretation possible here? In what follows, we will
argue that the availability of the non-conjectural interpretation for NPQs like the one
in (24) is crucially tied to the type of bias displayed by these questions. The negative
particle mica will be an important player in this story.
4 The role of bias
In this section, we examine the role that bias plays in the surprising pattern presented
in section 3.2. In section 4.1, we introduce some crucial background on biased
questions in Italian: Italian NPQs (just like NPQs in many other languages) trigger
a default positive bias. The negative marker mica reverses this default bias (Frana
& Rawlins 2016, forthcoming). In section 4.2, we show that the non-conjectural
interpretation for NPQs with the EF is only available in bias reversal cases. Finally, in
section 4.3, we suggest that this correlation arises via an interaction of the evidential
component of the EF and mica.
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4.1 Background: Italian NPQs and mica
Cross-linguistically, NPQs signal that the speaker had a pre-existing bias for the
positive answer (Ladd 1981; Büring & Gunlogson 2000; Romero & Han 2004, a.o.).
The example in (25) illustrates this for Italian: B’s question conveys that she assumed
that A had talked to Rosa recently, an assumption contradicted by A’s assertion. In
contradiction scenarios like this one the speaker may use an NPQ with the intention
of double-checking whether her prior expectation is still the case.
(25) A: I haven’t talked to Rosa in a long time.
B: Non
NEG
ti
you-CL
aveva
have.PAST.3sg
telefonato
called
qualche
few
giorno
day
fa?
ago
‘Didn’t she call you a few days ago?’
Frana & Rawlins (2016, forthcoming) show that Italian mica reverses the polarity
of this default bias (from positive to negative). The remainder of this section briefly
presents some basic background on mica and illustrates its bias reversal effect.
Mica is a negative marker that appears in declaratives and polar questions (Cinque
1976; Zanuttini 1997; Frana & Rawlins 2016, a.o.). In declaratives, mica is limited
to denials: it is inappropriate, e.g., in (26), where B is putting forward a new negative
proposition, but appropriate in (27), where B is challenging A’s assertion.14 15
(26) A: Who is married?
B: Io
I
non
not
sono
be.PRES.1sg
(#mica)
(#MICA)
sposato.
married
‘I am not married.’
(27) A: You are married.
B: No,
No.
non
Not
sono
be.PRES.1sg
(mica)
(MICA)
sposato.
married
‘No. I am NOT married.’
While in assertions mica is felicitous in a subset of the cases that allow for plain
negation (non), in polar questions mica and plain negation are in complementary
distribution. More specifically, mica reverses the default bias of NPQs: NPQs with
14 Mica can also deny previously introduced presuppositions and implicatures. See Frana & Rawlins
forthcoming for illustration of the full range of denial contexts that license mica in assertions.
15 Mica may occur in combination with non, as in (26) and (27), but also as an autonomous negative
element (e.g. Mica sono sposato). Following Frana & Rawlins, we assume that the autonomous and
the discontinuous forms are, at least in some dialects, semantically and pragmatically equivalent; all
the examples in this paper employ the discontinuous form.
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mica signal negative bias. This can be illustrated with the examples in (28) and (29),
from Frana & Rawlins forthcoming. (28) sets up a context in which the speaker
had a prior expectation for the positive answer, but now encounters evidence for the
opposite. In this scenario, the plain NPQ in (28a) is felicitous but the NPQ with
mica in (28b) is not. In contrast, in (29), the speaker had a prior bias for the negative
answer and is now faced with counter-evidence. Now, the reverse judgments obtain:
the NPQ in (29a) is infelicitous while the NPQ with mica in (29b) is felicitous.16
(28) Positive bias (S expected p, evidence against p). Clara invites Miles for
drinks late in the evening and tells him to come after dinner. When he gets
there, Miles asks if she has any food. Clara asks him:
a. Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
già
already
mangiato?
eaten?
‘Didn’t you eat already?’
b. # Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
mica
MICA
già
already
mangiato?
eaten?
(29) Negative bias (S expected ¬p, evidence for p). Clara invites Miles for
dinner and makes clear to him that she will prepare her best dishes. When he
gets there, Miles barely touches any food. Clara asks him:
a. # Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
già
already
mangiato?
eaten?
‘Didn’t you eat already?’
b. Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
mica
MICA
già
already
mangiato?
eaten?
4.2 Bias and the (non)-conjectural interpretation: the pattern
In this section we show that the non-conjectural interpretation of the EF in NPQs is
only available in bias reversal cases. Consider first our no appetite context, repeated
(in a simplified version) in (30). In this scenario, the speaker has a pre-existing bias
for the positive answer (and therefore the NPQ in (30a) is felicitous). Here, the NPQ
with the EF in (30b) can only have a conjectural interpretation, which gives rise to
oddity (as this is a question whose answer the hearer is expected to know).
16 Frana & Rawlins do not provide translations for mica NPQs since English has no exact equivalent of
mica. For this example, they suggest the following approximate paraphrases: ‘oh no, you didn’t eat,
did you’ and ‘you were not supposed to eat...did you?’ (Frana & Rawlins forthcoming: fn.16).
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(30) Positive bias (no appetite): S invited H for dinner and made it clear that he
was going to cook up a storm. H barely touches her food. S asks H:
a. Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
fame?
hunger?
‘Aren’t you hungry?’
b. # Non
not
avrai
have.FUT.2sg
fame?
hunger?
‘Are you not hungry, what’s your guess?’
Now, let’s go back to our insatiable context, repeated in (31). In this scenario, the
speaker is biased towards the negative answer (so the NPQ in (31a) is infelicitous).
Here, the question with the EF (and mica) can have a non-conjectural interpretation,
witness the acceptability of (31b).17
(31) Negative bias (insatiable): S and H had a big lunch and are sitting at a bar
for drinks. H asks for the food menu. S asks H:
a. # Non
not
hai
have.PRES.2sg
fame?
hunger?’
‘Aren’t you hungry?’
b. Non
not
avrai
have.FUT.2sg
mica
MICA
fame?
hunger?
‘Am I right in guessing that you are not hungry?’ (very roughly)
4.3 Bias and the (non)-conjectural interpretation: towards an explanation
We have shown that the non-conjectural interpretation of the EF is only available in
NPQs when the default bias is reversed. Where does this correlation come from? In
this section, we will sketch an approach along the following lines: Frana & Rawlins
(2016, forthcoming) analyze mica as a common ground management operator that
is always anchored to the speaker (section 4.3.1 gives some minimal background
on common ground management and provides a summary of Frana & Rawlins’s
account). We propose (section 4.3.2) that the presence of mica forces the EF to
be speaker-oriented (i.e., blocks interrogative flip). In turn, lack of flip yields a
non-conjectural interpretation.
17 At least for some speakers, it is possible to omit mica in (31b). However, bias reversal in (31b) (and
therefore the non-conjectural interpretation of this question) only obtains with the intonational contour
normally associated with mica NPQs. A characterization of the intonational patterns associated with
different types of biased questions is beyond the scope of this paper.
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4.3.1 Biases and CG-management
As we have seen, NPQs like (32a) signal positive bias on the part of the speaker. In
contrast, polar questions with focus stress or epistemic really convey negative bias:
the questions in (32b) indicate that the speaker expected Pepa not to go.
(32) a. Isn’t Pepa going?
b. Is Pepa GOING? / Is Pepa really going?
According to a prominent line of research (Romero & Han 2004; Repp 2013;
Frana & Rawlins forthcoming, a.o.), biases in polar questions can be derived by
assuming that really (or verum focus) and (high) negation contribute the common-
ground (CG) management operators VERUM and FALSUM, respectively. These
operators can also occur in assertions, as in (33) (FALSUM in assertions corresponds
to the focused negation used in denials).
(33) a. Pepa really is going.
b. Pepa is NOT going.
VERUM and FALSUM are perspectival meta-conversational operators that com-
bine with a proposition p and convey that a discourse agent (the speaker or the
hearer) is sure about p being (VERUM) or not being (FALSUM) in the common
ground. We will assume the denotations in (34) and (35), where the common ground
management component is modelled as a presupposition on the input context. On
this view, the denotation of FALSUM p, e.g., is only defined in a world w and context
c if the Origo of c is sure in w that in all the worlds satisfying their conversational
goals p is not common ground. When defined, FALSUM p is true in w iff p is false
in w (i.e., at the truth-conditional level FALSUM contributes negation).
(34) JVERUMKc,w = λ p . p
Defined for p,c,w iff
∀w′ ∈ EpistOrigoc(w) : (∀w′′ ∈ ConvOrigoc(w′) : p ∈CGw′′)
(Frana & Rawlins forthcoming, based on Romero & Han 2004)
(35) JFALSUMKc,w = λ p . ¬p
Defined for p,c,w iff
∀w′ ∈ EpistOrigoc(w) : (∀w′′ ∈ ConvOrigoc(w′) : p 6∈CGw′′)
(Frana & Rawlins forthcoming, based on Repp 2013)
Frana & Rawlins note that these operators are akin to evidentials in that they
display interrogative flip: their perspectival centre (Origo) is the speaker in (root)
assertions and the addressee in questions. Following some of the literature on
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evidentials (see e.g., Bhadra 2017 and references therein), they assume that the
Origo is effectively bound by the speech-act operator in Force-P, as illustrated in the
(simplified) LFs in (36).
(36) a. [ASSERTS[FALSUMS[Pepa is going]]]
b. [QH[FALSUMH[Pepa is going]]]
To see how this plays out in NPQs, consider the dialogue in (37). Given interrog-
ative flip, the Origo parameter is set to the hearer. Accordingly, the presupposition
of S’s question is hearer-oriented, as shown in (38). The question is only defined if
the hearer (H) is sure that in all the worlds satisfying her conversational goals it is
not common ground that she is going out. In (37), the presupposition is satisfied: H
asserted that she is staying home, which entails that she is not going out. Given this,
the question is defined (and thus denotes the set of its possible answers, see (38)).
(37) H: I am staying home.
S: Aren’t you going out?
(38) J [QH[FALSUMH[H is going out]]]Kc,w = {p,¬p}
Defined for p,c,w iff
∀w′ ∈ EpistHc(w) : (∀w′′ ∈ ConvHc(w′) : p 6∈CGw′′)
The positive bias associated with S’s question arises through a pragmatic com-
petition. Following Romero & Han 2004, Frana & Rawlins take CG-management
operators to be meta conversational moves whose choice over a simpler competitor
(a plain question) should be motivated. This is stated in the principle in (39).
(39) Principle of Economy Do not use a meta-conversational move unless neces-
sary (to resolve a Quality dilemma).
(Frana & Rawlins forthcoming, after Romero & Han 2004)
One type of situation where a quality dilemma arises is when the speaker is
in a state of epistemic conflict (S has a pre-existing bias and the context presents
counter-evidence). This explains why biased questions are felicitous in contradiction
scenarios: if S believed p but H produced evidence against p, S is justified in
questioning the appropriateness of adding p to the CG in order to resolve her
epistemic conflict.18 In (37), S’s choice of a question with FALSUM indicates that
she is facing a quality dilemma. Since H gave evidence for the negative answer, S
must have had a prior bias for the positive answer (i.e., that H is going out).
Now, let us address mica. On Frana & Rawlins’s analysis, mica introduces a
FALSUM operator that is necessarily anchored to the speaker, as shown in (40).
18 Frana & Rawlins also discuss other possible sources of quality dilemmas. The reader is referred to
their work for details.
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(40) JmicaKc = JFALSUMKc/Origo→sc,w
On this view, mica in polar questions does not undergo interrogative flip. This
perspectival stability leads to bias reversal. Consider again Frana & Rawlins’s dinner
scenarios in (28) and (29). The mica question in those scenarios is interpreted as in
(41). This question presupposes that the speaker is sure that p (that H has already
eaten) should not be CG (negative bias). The presupposition is satisfied only in
(29) where S believed ¬p was an established expectation. Moreover, given that S is
posing a meta-question, she must be trying to resolve an epistemic conflict. In (29),
there is contextual evidence against her prior expectation (Miles’ apparent lack of
appetite). Thus, S is facing a quality-dilemma (epistemic conflict) and can therefore
ask the meta-question without incurring in a violation of the Principle of Economy.
(41) J [QH[FALSUMS[H ate already]]]Kc,w = {p,¬p}
Defined for p,c,w iff
∀w′ ∈ EpistSc(w) : (∀w′′ ∈ ConvSc(w′) : p 6∈CGw′′)
4.3.2 Back to the EF
We are now ready to address the pattern displayed by the EF in NPQs. Recall our
generalization: non-conjectural interpretations are only available for NPQs where
the default bias is reversed. This was illustrated with the example in (24), where H
asks for the menu after having a big lunch, and S asks the question repeated in (42).
(42) Non
not
avrai
have.FUT.2sg.
mica
MICA
fame?
hunger?
‘Am I right in guessing that you are not hungry’?’ (very roughly)
In section 4.3.1, we saw that mica introduces a speaker-oriented FALSUM opera-
tor that blocks interrogative flip. As this operator sets the Origo parameter of the
context to the speaker, it forces the EF to also be speaker-oriented. Thus, the LF in
(43b) is blocked for a NPQ containing both mica and the EF. The only possible LF
for this kind of question is (43a).19
(43) a. [QH[FALSUMS[FUTS p]]]
b. [QH[FALSUMS[FUTH p]]]
19 We have noted in passing that mica is optional in bias reversal questions with the EF (see fn. 17).
This suggests that the operator denoted by mica can be covert in such cases. This operator seems to
always be covert in Spanish, whose EF patterns like the Italian one with respect to the data discussed
in this paper, but where there is no overt particle that indicates bias reversal.
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Given this, (42) triggers two presuppositions. First, due to mica, (42) presupposes
that the speaker is sure that p (that H is hungry) should not be CG. This presuppo-
sition is satisfied in the given scenario, where the speaker was biased towards ¬p.
Second, the EF introduces the presupposition that the speaker has at most indirect
evidence for the answer (also satisfied in the scenario). Nothing is presupposed
about the evidence available to the hearer, and therefore the question is felicitous
even though the hearer can be assumed to have direct evidence for the answer. Note
that nothing prevents the EF from flipping in NPQs with positive bias, which involve
regular FALSUM. As a result, these NPQs get a conjectural interpretation (as in (30)).
This setup makes a further prediction: since biased PPQs with the EF involve
VERUM, which is always hearer-oriented in questions (see 4.3.1), they should only
get a conjectural interpretation. This prediction is borne out. We have seen that the
question in (19a), where the hearer is expected to know the answer, is ruled out (it
presupposes that the hearer has (at most) indirect evidence for the answer). Adding
davvero (‘really’) does not get rid of the oddity, witness (44).
(44) # Davvero
really
sarai
be.FUT.2sg
sposato?
married
‘Are you really married, what’s your guess?’
5 To conclude
Recent work (Korotkova 2016; Bhadra 2017) draws a correlation between lack of
flip in evidential interrogatives and bias. This paper brings to the arena novel data
that show that this correlation is only partial. As we have seen, the EF displays
mixed behaviour in NPQs: NPQs with positive (default) bias flip (which results in a
conjectural interpretation) but NPQs with negative bias do not flip (and thus allow
for a non-conjectural interpretation). We have argued that what triggers lack of flip
is the presence of a CG management operator that sets the speaker as the Origo
parameter. This work raises the question of whether evidentials across languages
show analogous interactions with CG management operators, thereby opening up a
line of research that brings together two domains of inquiry that have had limited
overlap until now.
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